

Two Principles of Moral Performance in the Thought of Thomas Hobbes

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ABSTRACT: Hobbes is a dualist, presenting both an inertial and non-inertial theory of motion. Hobbes advocates a principle of inertial motion in his physics, including his physics of the human body. This view gives rise to a mechanistic theory of the emotions, a theory which would lead to a peculiarly non-Hobbesian political philosophy. In fact, Hobbes abandons the inertial theory of motion as he proceeds into his politics. Instead of being governed strictly by a principle of inertia, motion in the human body occurs in accordance with a will to power: a person has a "perpetual and restless desire of power after power". The will to power leads to a potency theory of the emotions, which Hobbes represents as a race in which every contestant has a "desire to be foremost". The race is the familiar "war of all against all", upon which Hobbes bases his politics.

TWO PRINCIPLES OF MORAL PERFORMANCE -- As long as nation-states exist, the political theories of Hobbes will be of interest to their citizens. But Hobbes is also significant because of how his philosophy deals with materialism and mechanism, particularly materialistic and mechanistic interpretations of human being. To be sure, Hobbes is a materialist and his materialism is partly mechanistic. But besides articulating a mechanistic materialism, Hobbes also articulates a non-mechanistic materialism. His materialism is dualistic, and this dualism is nowhere more clearly expressed than in his moral philosophy.

According to Hobbes, two principles govern the moral performances of individuals: one of *constancy*, another of *non-constancy*. The principles appear with special distinction in the primordial ground of Hobbes' moral philosophy: his theory of the passions -- because Hobbes articulates two different theories of the passions. The first is the *mechanistic theory of the passions*, defining affectivity and intentionality in terms of motion obeying that principle of constancy which is *inertia*. The second is the *potency theory of the emotions* defining affectivity and intentionality in terms of motion obeying that principle of non-constancy which is the *will to power*.

Inertia and the will to power belong together; each one is *hitched* to the other, and they drag each other around. Their tensions arrange all impression and expression, all passion and action. The omission of either makes morality incomplete or inconsistent; the inclusion of both frustrates any easy reductionism.

MATTER AND INERTIA -- The mechanistic theory of the emotions endeavors to reduce all affectivity and intentionality, all human passivity and operativity, to matter moving in a certain way. According to Hobbesian mechanism, matter has the property of inertia (as it has those of extension, weight, etc.), and therefore its motion is local motion governed by a *principle of constancy*. Hobbes [1] expresses his idea of inertia like this:

That when a thing lies still, unless somewhat else stir it, it will lie still forever, is a truth no man doubts of. But that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat else stay it, though the reason be the same, namely, that nothing can change itself, is not so easily assented to ... When a body is once in motion, it moveth, unless something else hinder it, eternally. (L 23; also BMC 111, 118, 131)

The rationale behind the principle of inertia, namely, that "nothing can change itself," is of the highest importance. The statement that "nothing can change itself" is one with extraordinary implications, because by means of it Hobbes grounds his materialism on an ontological assumption that will be both the deepest insight and most unquestioned presupposition of all mechanistic materialisms, right up to the end of modernity.

The principle of inertia is derived from the apparently self-evident truth that "nothing can change itself," but this apparent foundation of mechanism is itself grounded on the highly dubious -- certainly not self-legitimizing -- assumption that "matter" or "body" has a perpetual ontological equivalence with itself. It is because of this continuous auto-identity that inertia is a principle of constancy. Hobbesian matter, as governed by such a principle of inertia, is quite unlike aristotelian matter, whose local motion under efficient causality is subordinated to telic motion under final causality, so that the local motion of aristotelian matter expresses a substance's internal desire to become other than what it is, to realize the perfection of its form through the agency of its intrinsic entelechy.

Hobbesian matter, in its inertial aspect, contains no intrinsic tendency or desire to become other than what it is: the principle of inertia is a statement of matter's *self-referential equivalence*; like the Sartrean "in-itself," it is what it is and it is not what it is not. Matter obtains a fortuitous congruence with itself, a *reflexive congruence*, on the order of "A = A." This self-referential equivalence expels all otherness from the interiority or essentiality of everything material: matter under inertia is not self-alienated. Like the Sartrean in-itself, Hobbesian matter under inertia is capable of no transcendence, no self-modification, no self-overcoming, no self-motion [2]. Its lack of self-alienation forecloses all reflexivity, forcing it to be modified, overcome, and moved by some extrinsic alterity. Every change in any identity is an effect caused by some other, external identity.

The auto-identity of matter subordinated to a principle of inertial constancy entails a curious relation between motion and time and space. Because of its reflexive congruence, such matter cannot project a future which is *not*:: the inertial motion of matter generates no novelty. Apart from external interference, such matter will always be what it is. The inertial principle of constancy necessitates a bondage of the future to the past resulting in an eternal presence, presence without process, permanent stasis. This bondage of the future to the past through an invariable present, this incapacity of matter for spontaneous or telic self-modification, grounds the *determinism* of motion from cause to effect in time and space. All motion is reaction without action; all acceleration and deceleration of a body originate in its contact with an external, alien body. Motion is imparted to one body from an other body moving outside of it in space and prior to it in time. Inertial motion has its source some other place, some other time.

The Hobbesian principle of inertia, deduced from the opinion that "nothing can change itself," remains a decisive factor in two of the most powerful schools of twentieth century psychology, Behaviorism and Psycho-analysis. As in Hobbes' mechanistic theory of the emotions, so also in Behaviorism: a passion is an effect in the self caused deterministically by some extrinsic otherness: the stimulus. Due to the reflexive congruity of matter (its incapacity for self-modification), the stimulus triggers a physically determined response. At the roots of Psycho-analysis, in the text "Project For a Scientific Psychology," Freud states that the "First Principle Theorem" of neuronal functioning is "the principle of neuronal inertia: that neurones tend to divest themselves of Q."

MISTAKEN IDENTITY -- An interpretation of Hobbes from a purely mechanical perspective attempts to reduce Hobbesian *power* to the local inertial motion of matter. Evidently, Hobbes himself attempted this: "the power *motive* of the *body* is that by which it *moveth other* bodies, and we call *strength*" (BMC 206). Mechanistic power is the ability to move matter, and all that can move one mass of material is another mass of material moving. The power of one mass is its capacity to move *another* mass, it is "that by which it *moveth other* bodies". Since nothing can change itself, Hobbes appears to have reduced self-motion to motion from extrinsic otherness, to inertial motion.

With syllogistic precision, Hobbes shows that "Active power consists in motion":

the efficient cause of all motion and mutation consists in the motion of the agent ... the power of the agent is the same thing with the efficient cause. From whence it may be understood, that all active power consists in motion also (BMC 123-4).

Hobbes has here made three quick identities, to which he immediately cements a fourth: "A *final cause* has no place but in such things as have sense and will; and this I shall prove hereafter to be an efficient cause" (BMC 124).

Hobbes advocates the identification of power with motion, and final with efficient causality; that power reveals itself as motion, and finality as efficiency, and that nothing but matter can move matter -- these three statements are true throughout Hobbes' philosophy. But nowhere does Hobbes identify the motion of matter with inertial motion *alone*: this equation ends where his reflections on humanity and politics begin. That power reveals itself as motion is true in Hobbes, but that power reveals itself as *inertial* motion is false. That finality reveals itself only as efficiency, true, but that it is an efficiency obedient to a law of constancy, false. That nothing but matter moves matter, true, but that one mass can move only masses external to itself, false. Hobbes does not completely subordinate matter to a principle of constancy preventing matter from self-motion.

CONSTANCY AND NON-CONSTANCY -- The principle of inertia is a *principle of constancy* founded on the assumption that "nothing can change itself." Matter is thus governed by an intrinsic law of reflexive coincidence, of naturally necessary self-sameness foreclosing all self-referential relations beside equivalence. Like the Sartrean "in-itself," matter whose motion originates in the identity of being with itself is matter which simply is what it is and is not what it is not. Hobbes does indeed define one kind of motion as originating out of that self-referential equivalence which is a principle of constancy -- such is his idea of *inertial motion*. Nevertheless, Hobbes does not limit himself to this single principle of motility alone: Hobbes is a dualist, not a monist. Hobbes associates a kind of motion with power, but motion not inertial, and while inertia is founded on the ontological assumption of an auto-identity of being with itself, *Hobbes always describes power in terms of self-referential inequivalence*, a reflexive non-coincidence directly contrary to the inertial principle of constancy. Hobbes thus adds a second ontological assumption to his philosophy, a *principle of non-constancy*: the will to power. In the tension between the two contraries, inertia and will to power, Hobbes works out his psychology and politics.

The Hobbesian will to power is a *principle of non-constancy* founded on the assumption that something can change itself -- matter governed by the will to power obeys a law of reflexive non-coincidence, of naturally necessary self-variance opening on every self-referential relation besides equivalence. Matter whose motion originates in the will to power is subordinated to an imperative commanding it to become other than what it was, more than what it was -- this process of its past into its future is its presence. In contrast to the will to power, the temporality of inertia determines that matter moving inertially shall, without outside interference, have a future identical to its past. Inertia's reflexive coincidence places truth in eternity, excludes process from presence, and (only) this allows logic to be grounded in the law of non-contradiction. But the temporality of power determines that motion governed by power shall, without outside interference, have a future different from its past. Power's reflexive non-coincidence places truth in time, inserts process into presence, and grounds logic in the paradoxes of self-reference. In terms of motion, power accelerates, while inertia conserves momentum: "For the nature of power, is in this point, like to fame, increasing as it proceeds; or like the motion of heavy bodies, which the further they go, make still the more haste" (L 72). Power indeed reveals

itself as motion, but not inertial motion, and Hobbesian materialism is not a mechanistic materialism.

In order to be what it is, power must become more than what it was. In terms of motion, matter animated by the will to power is accelerated. Indeed, the cause of mankind's "perpetual and restless desire of power after power" is not because

a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more (L 80).

The self-referential inequivalence of the will to power is possible only as a kind of temporality, a kind of synthesis of past, present, and future -- the temporality of power, which, to be what it is, must become more than what it was, and the will to power is precisely what the temporality of power is. The will to power is a *principle of non-constancy*, articulated by Hobbes as "conservation is augmentation" -- "such augmentation of dominion over men being necessary to a man's conservation, it ought to be allowed him" (L 99). For Hobbes, self-preservation is self-aggrandizement, and this self-referential inequivalence is the very nature of Hobbesian power.

The temporality of power, that for it to be what it is, it must become more than what it was, is associated with the ontology of power, which is such that matter animated by power is what it is not and is not what it is. The will to power involves Hobbesian matter in an ontology similar to that of the Sartrean "for-itself," which is a "being which is not what it is and which is what it is not" [3]. Like matter animated by power, whose acceleration is founded on power's failure to coincide with itself, so too Sartre holds that the "for-itself is a lack and that what it lacks is a certain coincidence with itself" [4].

The will to power, a principle of non-constancy establishing the motion of matter along with the principle of inertia, entails its own psychology which is not an inertial or stimulus-response psychology. It is a psychology based on neither homeostasis nor reactivity, but rather on excess and activity. The principle of such a psychology could be similar to what Freud, in the "Project" calls the "secondary function" of the nervous system: due to the "exigencies of life," it has to maintain a store of psychic energy. However, Freud states that the secondary function tends to keep this store constant, and this tendency is clearly counter to that of the Hobbesian will to power. Indeed, the Hobbesian potency psychology, so far from being "beyond freedom and dignity," will instead be as much "beyond the pleasure principle" as it is "beyond good and evil."

POWER AND DIVINITY -- The Hobbesian will to power is a perpetual self-overcoming aiming at the unlimited increasing of the potency of that matter which it animates. In self-overcoming, power overcomes itself: whatever the past power of the self, the will to power projects the self into a position of greater future power. Such expansion without bounds projects the self into a position of unlimited power, of omnipotence. This position of omnipotence, whereat the will to power aims, is the will to power's goal. But this position of omnipotence, of infinite power, is the position of the Hobbesian divinity: it is, metaphorically speaking, the *Throne of God*. The few attributes of the Hobbesian divinity are "eternal, infinite, and omnipotent" (L 88, 89, 262). As omnipotent, the power of God exceeds that of everything else -- in any comparison, ranking, or hierarchy, God is foremost, and his place is the *position of being foremost*. The seat of this divinity is that place wherein power is infinite; it is the will to power's goal. The will to power, a principle of non-inertial motion animating masses of Hobbesian matter, animating Hobbesian human beings, projects every human being, every self, into the position of being foremost. The goal of every being animated by the will to power is to seat itself in the Throne of God, wherein that self will be omnipotent.

The will to power aims at the omnipotence of all that materiality it animates: excessive power attracts, supremely excessive power attracts supremely, just as the aristotelian prime mover attracts, and the Hobbesian divinity is a prime mover similar to the aristotelian: "there must be, as even the heathen philosophers confessed, one first mover; that is, a first, and an eternal cause of all things; which is that which men mean by the name of God" (L 88). The Hobbesian prime mover operates as the aristotelian, that is, the Throne of God operates as a *final cause*, as an attractive goal. But from Aristotle to Hobbes, the axis of attraction supports an inversion: the Hobbesian divinity, though *unmoved*, is neither motionless nor at rest, but is, on the contrary, an unlimited intensity of motion. As such an unlimited intensity of motion, it is the *goal* of matter whose motion is derived from that principle of non-constancy which the will to power is.

The goal of omnipotence attracts the self, and this attraction is the goal's power, infinite power. The goal's attractiveness inspires in the self that self-motion which is self-overcoming, self-transcendence. The attraction itself is that which "in the first place," says Hobbes, "I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death" (L 80). This desire of power after power is that desire aroused by the goal of power without lack, by infinite power, and this desire excited by omnipotence's attractiveness, is nothing other than the *will to power*, the *will to be* foremost, the *will to be* seated in the Throne of God. And thus the Throne of God, wherein every self strives to situate itself, is an unmoved mover, an unaccelerated accelerator, for Hobbes considers power's principle of non-constancy, its self-referential incongruity, as an accelerativity: "For the nature of power, is in this point, like to fame, increasing as it proceeds; or like the motion of heavy bodies, which the further they go, make still the more haste" (L 72).

Because its omnipotence is attractive, the Throne of God arouses motion in matter, but the motion excited thereby is self-motion and not inertial motion. The causality of the Throne of God is not efficient causality operating from a past cause through a non-disruptive present to a future effect. Instead, the attractivity of the Hobbesian prime mover, the causality of divine omnipotence, is final causality operating from a future cause to a past effect such that presence itself is an upsurge of continually increasing potency. Final causality is an attraction, and this attraction is a *pull*, a pull wherein the future pulls the past over the present wherefore the present is an overcoming, which is to say: power is what it is if and only if it becomes more than what it was. Whereas final causality is this pull by the future of the past over the present into the future, efficient causality is contrariwise a *push*, a push wherein the past pushes the future through a present unmodified thereby. The distinction between final and efficient causalities is a distinction between two counterpoised temporalities, where temporality means a synthesis of past, present, and future under the guidance of a unifying principle.

The Throne of God is that unaccelerated accelerator arousing, in Hobbesian matter, unaccelerated acceleration -- divine omnipotence excites, within the material, the will to power; the goal arouses that project aiming at it. Fundamentally, then, the unaccelerated accelerator, the source of all non-inertial motion, is the Throne of God, the goal whereat the will to power aims. But this source of unmoved motion, while fundamental, is indirect. Directly, the unaccelerated accelerator is the will to power aiming at its goal: the self-motion aroused by the attraction of the divinity's position of being foremost is a self-overcoming which is non-inertial motion, unaccelerated acceleration.

The unaccelerated accelerator, the Hobbesian will to power, compels that matter it animates to move without having been moved by anything else prior in time or exterior in space: it is the attractiveness of the future goal which arouses that projection which the will to power is. The motion of a being which has not been moved by the temporally prior movement of a spatially exterior being is self-motion underived from any extrinsic alterity. Yet it is some otherness which derives self-motion: a future goal, the self seated in the Throne of God, the self in the position of being foremost, excites the projection into that position, arouses self-overcoming. This future situation is other than the self's present

situation, but this otherness is an otherness of the self to itself. The self exceeds itself because of otherness indeed, but otherness which belongs to it, which is its own. So far from being auto-identical, such being is self-alienated. Motion not moved by extrinsic alterity -- temporal priority, spatial externality -- is self-motion, and can only be made by a being which is what it is if and only if it becomes other than what it was, a being whose presence is the otherness of its future to its past.

The Hobbesian will to power projects that material which it animates into the position of being foremost. The being of material so projected is being-ahead-of-itself. Such being-ahead characterizes a being which is not what it is and which is what it is not -- being not possessing any reflexive coincidence. The will to power is a principle of self-referential inequivalence compelling the motion of a mass of excited material to become other than what it was, more than what it was: the will to power accelerates matter, and, while inertia grounds the reactivity of matter, the will to power grounds matter's activity. Matter animated by the will to power moves itself.

THE WILL TO POWER AND OTHERNESS: THE RACE -- The will to power's projection of singular individuals into the position of being foremost leads to a competition between different individuals whenever they come together, and whenever they do come together, it is the will to power that has gathered them. Hobbes shows how the will to power causes this competition in his complex theory of the origins of human conflict, expressed in *Leviathan*, chapter 13. He begins by stating that all men are by nature equal. This natural equality is an essential requirement for the origin of human conflict: "From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies" (L 98). Such original equality of disparate individuals, while necessary for competition, is hardly sufficient: it is difficult to see why such equality of ability does not lead to equality of fear, to mutual respect, and thence to compromise, cooperation, and concord. Equality alone might well derive harmony, and produce an immediate social contract out of mutual respect and recognition. But such is not what happens in the Hobbesian world; this equality is one of the conditions for the war of all against all.

The initial natural equality of individuals is an equilibrium of motion, an equilibrium without excess, an inertial equilibrium in which there is no overcoming, neither the overcoming of the self by the self, nor the overcoming of the other by the self. In the beginning, there is equal motion, nothing changes itself, there is no self-motion, the will to power animates no bodies. But this inertial equilibrium is only an origin: it immediately disintegrates. Just as there is an original equilibrium, so also there appears an original inequality. The will to power appears as the first failure of the principle of inertia in determining the motion of matter, it appears as the first motion of the self that is not caused by the motion of some extrinsic otherness; this is the first unmoved motion, the first case of self-motion, wherein something changes itself.

Within the natural inertial equilibrium, within the original paradise of inertial harmony, there appears the original conflict: the will to power projects certain individuals into the position of being foremost, into the Throne of God. As Hobbes puts it:

because there be some, that taking pleasure contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue further than their security requires; if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by standing only on their defense, to subsist (L 99).

Here, then, are the first who "taking pleasure contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest" extend their aggression "further than their security requires." Whoever these first are, they are not stimulus-response machines; their motion is not governed by inertia,

for such mechanical motion pursues its conquest only so far as its security requires, no further. Here, then, is the first appearance of an unmoved motion, an unaccelerated acceleration. Here is the first appearance of a non-reactive excess of motion imbalancing forever the otherwise eternally stable inertial equilibrium. Here is the entrance of self-motion, of self-referential inequivalence, of the will to power's projective acceleration. This projective acceleration causes some individuals to extend their aggression "further than their security requires." This extension is an excess of motion that transgresses the bounds established by reaction, that transgresses that law of inertial motion which states that, for stimulus-response machines: "for every action (stimulus), there is an equal and opposite reaction (response)." Reactivity is exceeded by self-motion, and the will to power's projection of certain individuals into the Throne of God is the original sin casting the human plurality out of its initial inertial paradise.

The will to power is a principle of non-constancy: in order for power to be what it is, power must become more than what it was. The power of any self animated by the will to power is thus compelled to perpetually exceed itself, to become greater than what it was, and this boundless growth terminates only with the situation of the self in the Throne of God, the position of being foremost, a position wherein the self's power is superior to every other's power. The power of a solitary self, isolated from all other selves, is compared only to itself in its growth beyond itself. However, in the presence of another individual, the power of the self, as a growth acknowledging no upper bound, is compared now also to the power of the other, which the self must exceed in order to be sure that its power is indeed still growing without bound -- for if the self should fail to overcome and dominate the other, then the self has certainly failed to overcome itself. Here, then, is the motive of those selves who take "pleasure contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue further than their security requires." But this motive is simply the will to power itself, and in it any need for the self to recognize itself through the other can be no more than secondary. Here the primary, immediate desire of the self is simply that pleasure it experiences in the exercise of its own power.

The self-overcoming of those who are originally animated by the will to power is a self-overcoming mediated by that intrinsic alterity caused by the will to power's self-referential inequivalence. However, these individuals who are *originally* projected by the will to power comprise not the totality of human beings -- there are "others," who "would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds." The members of this second group are clearly not themselves directly animated by the will to power. Were it not for outside interference, were it not for the self-aggrandizement of those whom the will to power has *already* animated, the members of the second group would recognize no imperative commanding self-overcoming, would participate in no competition. Any self-overcoming aroused in a member of the second group is self-overcoming not mediated by any intrinsic alterity, but mediated rather by the extrinsic alterity of those others originally projected by the will to power, others whose motion is spatially exterior and temporally prior. The second group of individuals or selves will nevertheless be compelled to submit to a principle of non-constancy, to participate in the competition -- into this second group, the will to power propagates, and it is through inertial motion that the Hobbesian will to power's non-inertial motion spreads.

An individual who is not yet animated by the will to power, whose power does not yet have to become more than what it was in order to be what it is, is confronted by an individual who is being projected by the will to power into the position of being foremost. This first individual, who is content with his present power, is confronted by a second individual, who -- because this second individual's power must become greater in order to remain constant -- desires to conquer the first individual. Hence, in order for the first individual to conserve his own potency, in order for this first self to remain equivalent to itself, "to assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present" -- this first self must exceed the power of a threatening other, of the second self. Note that merely equalling the power of this threatening other simply transfers the same conflict to a higher

level of intensity. Thus: in order to be what it is, the self's power must become more than this threatening other's power. But the other is, simultaneously, endeavoring to overwhelm the self, so that, in order to be what it is, the self's power must exceed the power of this other whose power must exceed the self's. The circuit is complete: by reflection back from an extrinsic alterity, the self's power is referred back to itself so that, in order to be what it is, the self's power must become more than what it was. The first self is thus projected by the will to power, and this projection has been inertially transmitted: it is the response of the first self to a stimulus which the second self is.

From the site of its initial appearance, the will to power thus propagates, until all human beings have become involved in the competition, the life-and-death struggle, for the position of being foremost. The will to power's projective acceleration spreads through the original inertial equilibrium until it projects every individual into the Throne of God.

The will to power itself, though it may be inertially propagated throughout the *entire* plurality of human beings, is nevertheless not *originally* universal and necessary. An individual confronted by the prospect of an aggressor's overwhelming potency need not endeavor to pre-empt that aggressor or invader by augmenting his own present power, an individual need not obey the law of non-inertial motion, the law of power, which is "conservation is augmentation." However, if any "should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by standing only on their defense, to subsist." This is simply the negative formulation of the will to power as a self-referential inequivalence: if it does not become more than what it was, power cannot be what it is. Hence, on the one hand, while the self-referential inequivalence of power as a *excess* over itself is not a universal and necessary determinant of human being, on the other hand, after the will to power has appeared, self-referential inequivalence of power *in general* is universal and necessary. That is, power which does not become *more* than what it was has no alternative other than to become *less* than what it was. There is no more inertial equality of forces, and the imperative of the will to power is clear: accelerate or die.

The will to power projects all individuals into the *position of being foremost* -- personal omnipotence, that infinite power which is the goal of the individual's *will to power*. This projection structures any human plurality into the form of a *race* (BMC 224), and all human relations are determined by this structure. It is this position of being foremost, not some scarce material resource, that in Hobbes is what all men have equal hope to attain but cannot share because it is occupiable by only one. The position of being foremost is a position of superiority or mastery. Hobbes expresses it like this:

there is no way for any man to secure himself, so reasonable, as anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: and this is no more than his own conservation requireth (L 99).

It is, thus, in order to *conserve* itself, to maintain its self-equivalence, to be what it is, that the power of the self is compelled to exceed the power of others. But this compulsion and endeavor to overpower an other is a consequence of the will to power, which compels the self's power to exceed itself. The will to power projects the self into the position of being foremost, and it projects the other there also, so that in order for the self to be situated therein, the self must exceed the other. Were it not for the will to power of each, such competition between many would never arise.

THE TWO PARTS OF LEVIATHAN CHAPTER 6 -- The tension between the mechanistic and potency theories of the passions appears in Chapter 6 of *Leviathan*. This chapter is essentially split in half, and the little coherence that does exist between its two divisions is maintained by a precarious network of superficial linkages.

The first part of the chapter presents a mechanistic theory of the emotions, a theory explaining passion in terms of matter moving inertially. This section concludes with

Hobbes' articulation of a list of six simple passions, each derived from mechanistic considerations.

The second part of the chapter consists of the definitions of numerous complex passions, along with some discussions concerning deliberation, the will, etc. Only the passions matter here. Since Hobbes has defined the six simple passions in mechanistic terms, and since he claims to reason in accordance with the method of geometry, one expects that the definitions of the complex passions will follow from those of the simple passions as theorems follow from axioms, and that the complex passions will admit of perspicuous reductions to matter moving inertially. But the lack of coherence between his mechanistic theory of the passions and his definitions of the complex passions is striking. New terms are introduced without explanation; ungrounded assumptions about the relations between individuals intrude. Indeed the lack of consistency between the second part of the chapter and the first would remain a perfect mystery if it were not for the fact that the second half constitutes a thinly disguised potency theory of the passions -- a theory that had appeared earlier in Hobbes' work.

MOTION AND PASSION -- The first part of *Leviathan* Chapter 6 presents a mechanistic theory of the emotions that begins with a stimulus, a source of motion external to and other than the self. The external motion of the stimulus is transmitted to the body directly, if the body and stimulus are contiguous, or indirectly if not. The motion enters the body through the sense organs: "sense is motion in the organs and interior parts of man's body, caused by the action of the things we see, hear, &c" (L 47). From perception, the physical agitation of bodily substance excites the imagination: "fancy is but the relics of the same motion, remaining after sense" (L 47). Such disturbance in the imagination is "the first internal beginnings of all voluntary motion" (L 47) and "These small beginnings of motion, within the body of man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are commonly called *endeavor*" (L 47). From the stimulus, sensation is motion in the perceptual organs; from sensation, this same motion continues as imagination, making its way to the heart -- when the effects of the stimulus "is continued from the eyes, ears, and other organs to the heart, the real effect there is nothing but motion, or endeavor" (L 46). This motion in the body's matter, from sensation, through imagination, and to the heart is *passion*: "sense proceedeth from the action of external objects upon the *brain*, or some internal *substance* of the *head*; and that the *passions* proceed from the alteration there made, and continued to the *heart*" (BMC 226).

APPETITE AND AVERSION, PLEASURE AND PAIN -- Endeavor, as motion, may be either movement of the affected body toward or away from the stimulus. Endeavor toward the stimulus is *appetite*: "This endeavor, when it is toward something which causes it, is called *appetite*" (L 47). Endeavor away from the stimulus is aversion: "when the endeavor is fromward something, it is generally called *aversion*" (L 47). Hobbes defines good as that which arouses appetite; evil as what provokes aversion: "whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth *good*: and the object of his hate and aversion, *evil*" (L 48). Since whatever arouses appetite is good, and aversion evil, and since "*Pleasure* therefore, or *delight*, is the appearance or sense of good; and *molestation*, or *displeasure*, the appearance, or sense of evil" (L 49). Pleasure is thus the appearance of the motion towards the stimulus called appetite, and pain is the appearance of that motion fromward the stimulus which is called aversion. The *appearance* of pleasure or pain is for Hobbes nevertheless reducible to motion -- to the relation of the motion caused in the body by the stimulus (motion of the other) and the motion of the body without stimulation (motion of the self, Hobbes' "vital motion"). When the motion of the other is a *positivity* with respect to the motion of the self, this positivity is pleasure. When it is a *negativity*, that negativity is pain: "This motion, which is called appetite, and for the appearance of it *delight*, and *pleasure*, seemeth to be a

corroboration of vital motion, and a help thereunto; ... and the contrary, *molesta*, *offensive*, from the hindering, and troubling the motion vital" (L 49).

THE SIMPLE PASSIONS -- The motion of the other (the stimulus) enters the body and engages the motion of the self (the vital motion), assisting or hindering. The assistance, felt as pleasure, yields appetite. The hindrance, felt as pain, yields aversion. Appetite is a relation to the stimulus which is motion or endeavor towards it, and whatever arouses appetite also arouses love; the difference between appetite and love is in the absence or presence of the stimulus. Absence -- expressed in a Hobbesian way in terms of motion -- means that the motion from the stimulus is mediated, that stimulus and self are not contiguous. Similarly, presence means that the stimulus and self are contiguous, that the transmission of motion from the other to the self is immediate. The same reasoning distinguishes aversion and hate. Hence: "desire and love are the same thing; save that by desire we always signify the absence of the object; by love, most commonly the presence of the same. So also by aversion, we signify the absence; and by hate, the presence of the object" (L 48).

Since an individual can participate in a situation both actually and in imagination, the pleasure or pain aroused by that participation will be either sensual, if the participation is actual, or mental, if imaginary. The distinction between sensual and mental pleasure distinguishes love from joy. Love is aroused by objects present to sensation, joy by objects present to imagination. In either case, appetite may be aroused also, since an object present in perception need not be contiguous to the perceiver in space, and an object present in imagination is not contiguous in time. An analogous reasoning distinguishes between aversion, hate, and grief. Objects present to sense arouse hate, while those present in imagination arouse grief.

There are thus SIX (though Hobbes by redundancy lists 7) simple or primary passions according to the mechanistic theory developed in the first part of Chapter 6 of *Leviathan*: "These simple passions called appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, and grief" (L 50).

REPULSION VERSUS HATRED -- When the motion a patient receives from a stimulus counteracts that patient's vital motion, such counteraction is felt as pain arousing a response intending to eliminate the reception. There are two primary ways to realize this intention motivated by pain: destroy the stimulus itself, or destroy the patient's contact with the stimulus. These two responses are expressed as "fight or flight," and define two distinct affective-intentional relations between an agent (stimulus) and patient (respondent receiver). These two affective-intentional relations are the emotions of *hatred* and *repulsion*, respectively.

Hatred can be defined thus as the reception of pain from a stimulus motivating the intent to eliminate that reception by destroying the stimulus itself (fight). Repulsion can be defined as the reception of pain from a stimulus motivating the intent to eliminate that reception by destroying contact with the stimulus (flight).

While it is possible to thus distinguish hate and repulsion, Hobbes does not do so, nor can he in terms of his mechanistic psychology. Hobbesian hatred is simply aversion: endeavor from a stimulus producing pain. It is a flight response, and what Hobbes calls hatred is here called repulsion. But what is called hatred here is an endeavor toward a painful stimulus in order to destroy it -- an appetite aroused by pain. Such an appetite, according to Hobbes' mechanistic psychology, is impossible. Note that Hobbes does not confuse his version of hatred with his version of revengefulness.

HOPE, DESPAIR, FEAR, COURAGE -- That the definitions of the complex passions in the second part of chapter 6 have little connection to the mechanistic psychology of the first part, follows quickly from an examination of them.

The first complex emotions Hobbes defines are hope, despair, fear, and courage (L 50):

Hope is appetite with an opinion of attaining the object.
Despair is appetite with an opinion of *not* attaining the object.
Fear is aversion with an opinion of *not* avoiding the object.
Courage is aversion with an opinion of avoiding the object.

Appetite and aversion are certainly and legitimately included in these definitions, but it is neither of these that distinguish those passions; on the contrary, it is the opinions. For hope and despair diverge from love because of the opinion of attaining the desired object or not, and fear and courage diverge from hate similarly. The opinions, then, of attaining or avoiding or not, make these passions. *These opinions have no mechanistic origins, but spring rather from considerations of power.*

REVENGE -- "*Desire*, by doing hurt to another, to make him condemn some fact of his own" is Hobbes' definition of revenge in *Leviathan* (L 50). That revengefulness is such desire, true enough, but all that distinguishes it from cruelty -- which Hobbes holds to be impossible -- is that it originates in an injury the other has done to the self, an injury returned. If this is granted, then revengefulness, as well as resentment (L 81), cannot be derived from mechanistic principles: both are appetites for a hated object; appetite for what arouses aversion -- is a contradiction.

EMULATION, ENVY -- "*Grief*, for the success of a competitor in wealth, honor, or other good, if it be joined with endeavor to enforce our own abilities to equal or exceed him, is called *emulation*: but joined with endeavor to supplant or hinder a competitor, *envy*" (L 53). Emulation and envy are thus in part appetite for the other's good; but this good is the "success of a competitor," and this implies that it is some excess of success over the success of the self, for when there is competition, some common measure of comparison must be found. Yet it is not easy to see how mechanics, whose principle is inertia, could yield either envy or emulation, each of which is an appetite for excess above an other. Especially if the other's success arouses grief, for then the other's motion causes the self pain, by hindering the vital motion of the self, and according to the principle of inertia, when the motion of the self is hindered by the other's movement, it follows that the motion of the self will remain constantly in this diminished state, unless some third motion accelerates it beyond the intensity of the other's motion. But to say that this acceleration is in fact the other's motion (which was a hindrance), and thus to say that *grief* can arouse an endeavor to exceed, is contradictory. Furthermore, if emulation diverges from envy, it is only because emulation contains an element of *love* for the other, while envy contains an element of hate. But if this is so, it is hard to see how emulation contains any grief. Joy is more appropriate.

THE POLITICAL IRRELEVANCE OF THE MECHANISTIC THEORY -- With respect to the relations that Hobbes develops between passions and politics, his mechanistic theory of the emotions is both useless and never used. The first part of Chapter 6, and the mechanistic residues that creep into the second part, are peripheral and secondary considerations inflated only by modern scientism to the level of claims with primary status. The remainder of *Leviathan*, beginning with the discussion of madness in Ch. 8, will make glory and dejection -- and their Hobbesian synonyms, pride and fear -- the primary passions. These two emotions form the moral basis of the entire political theory of *Leviathan*. This has been both recognized and amply documented by Leo Strauss in his *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes* [5]. After the first part of Ch. 6, the mechanistic theory appears only in a consequential form: the mechanical is the self-contradiction of power.

The irrelevance of the mechanistic theory of the passions, and of mechanistic psychology in general, for politics is due to the fact that such a theory is a part of *animal psychology*, not *human psychology*, and, while the mechanistic theory arrives at a certain

comprehension of emotion, it is nevertheless not a theory of human affectivity or intentionality. Mechanistic psychology is a theory of animal reactivity, not human activity. But, to be sure, neither animalistic nor mechanistic considerations can be *excluded* from human psychology. Included they are, but not as primordial. Hobbes makes a distinction between merely animal versus properly human passions, and the relevance of each to politics in general. He explains "Why certain creatures, without reason or speech, do nevertheless live in society, without any coercive power" (L 131).

THE POLITICS OF AN ANIMAL PSYCHOLOGY -- Hobbes presents 6 reasons why "certain living creatures, as bees, and ants, live sociably with one another" (L 131). In the first five of these reasons, Hobbes shows that it is the passion of pride, or vanity, that distinguishes these political animals from man. The sixth reason concerns fear, but is not examined here.

Concerning why men cannot live together like these animals, Hobbes begins: "Firstly, that men are continually in competition for honor and dignity, which these creatures are not; and consequently amongst men there ariseth on that ground, envy and hatred, and finally war; but amongst these not so" (L 131).

Second, while by means of instinctual programming nature has arranged that the private good of each creature entails the common good, "man, whose joy consisteth in comparing himself with other men, can relish nothing but what is eminent" (L 131), and thus each man will happily sacrifice the common good of all on his altar of self-love.

Thirdly, while man indeed possess a certain rationality above these animals, he uses it not to promote the common good, but on the contrary to prove his superiority: "amongst men, there are very many, that think themselves wiser, and abler to govern the public, better than the rest" (L 131). The contention between such minds breeds war.

Fourth, the languages of these creatures are only systems of signalling, naturally unusable for misrepresentation. Hence the vanity of these creatures, if even existing, is incommunicable, thus politically irrelevant: the ambition of whosoever believes in the superiority of his own ideology remains mute, there are no vain demagogues using rhetoric for "discontenting men, and troubling their peace at their pleasure" (L 131).

Fifth, Hobbesian animals "cannot distinguish between *injury*, and *damage*" (L 131). These stimulus-response machines cannot differentiate between pain and offense; but pain arouses hatred, aiming at nothing more than breaking contact with an immediate stimulus, whereas offense arouses revenge, which will exceed every limit to gain its satisfaction.

TOWARD AN ORIGINAL OPENING -- The divergence appearing between the mechanistic and potency theories in Chapter 6 of *Leviathan* represents an earlier and deeper cleavage opening in Hobbes' text *Human Nature*; indeed, *Leviathan* Chapter 6 is a strange juxtaposition of *Human Nature's* Chapters 7 and 9.

Chapter 7 of *Human Nature* presents a mechanistic theory of the passions. From this text to *Leviathan*, little changes; the first part of *Leviathan* Chapter 6 replicates almost exactly *Human Nature* Chapter 7.

Chapter 9 of *Human Nature* begins with a discussion of glory and dejection, then analyzes a variety of passions in terms of the feeling of power of the self in comparison with the power of some other. Chapter 9 presents a potency theory of the passions. Indeed, the chapter intervening between the mechanistic theory of 7 and the potency theory of 9 consists of a discussion of power and honor. As might be expected, it is in this intervening chapter 8 that the tension between the two becomes most concentrated -- then disappears abruptly. At the beginning of Chapter 8, Hobbes remarks "motion and agitation of the brain, which we call conception, to be continued to the heart, and there to be called *passion*" (BMC 210). But at the chapter's end -- only 7 short paragraphs later -- Hobbes declares: "In the pleasure men have, or displeasure from the sighs of honor or dishonor done unto them, consisteth the nature of the passions" (BMC 214).

Chapter 9, after undergoing some revision, becomes the second part of *Leviathan* Chapter 6. But the topics of Chapter 8 of *Human Nature* are moved to Chapter 10 of *Leviathan* -- a radical displacement. And, because much of Chapter 9 remains in the second part of *Leviathan* Chapter 6, it is this curious translocation of Hobbes' discussion of honor and power that explains the disjunction which splits *Leviathan's* Chapter 6 in half.

THE POTENCY THEORY OF THE EMOTIONS -- The consideration that inertia alone governs the motion of matter derives an animal psychology containing a mechanistic theory of the emotions. The consideration that the will to power also governs the motion of matter derives a truly human psychology containing another theory of human affectivity and intentionality: the potency theory of the emotions. The potency theory relates every mood to a *feeling of power*:

because the passions ... consist in the conception of the future, that is to say, in conception of power past, and the act to come; before I go any further, I must in the next place speak somewhat concerning this power (BMC 212).

In Hobbes, power directly relates to both affectivity and intentionality; through emotions, the self is impressed by, and also expresses, power. The self is sensitive to the appearance of power: potency impresses, arousing awe, exciting envy, or inspiring love; impotency impresses also, arousing contempt. An emotion, expressed from self to other, signifies the self's power and, if signifying potency, is honorable; if impotency, dishonorable: "Magnanimity, liberality, hope, courage, confidence, are honourable; for they proceed from the conscience of power. Pusillanimity, parsimony, fear, diffidence, are dishonorable" (L 75).

Like inertia, power appears in the determination of the motions of bodies: while inertia is the capacity that a body has to move or be moved by *another* body, power is the capacity that a body has to move and be moved by *itself*. Power accelerates that body it animates; such acceleration, which is self-motion, may be inertially transmitted to and inertially received by another body, affecting that other body's vital motion, if it is alive. As such, self-motion is an ability to arouse pleasure or pain, appetite or aversion, in the other. But as a living body's vital motion may be hindered or helped inertially, through motion from a stimulus, so also the power of that very same living body enables it to move itself, to affect its own vital motion, and hence to amplify or counteract the effects of the motion received from the stimulus: power, as self-motion, is an ability to be sensitive or resistant to any pleasure or pain, any appetite or aversion, aroused by some external other.

Power reveals itself only in that competition which it causes, and there only as the result of a comparison. It is always either an excess or deficiency of the power of one competitor over or under the power of other competitor(s):

because the power of one man resisteth and hindereth the effects of the power of another, *power* simply is no more, but the *excess* of the power of one above that of another: for equal powers opposed destroy one another; and such their opposition is called contention (BMC 212).

According to Hobbes, individual human beings are engaged each in a competition with all others; they are not cooperative, and "the power of one man resisteth and hindereth" another man's potency, rather than amplifying or encouraging it. The goal of this competition is nothing other than the possession of more power than every other competitor. This competition for power --or for the honor which reflects potency -- is a *race*: "But this *race* we must suppose to have no other *goal*, nor other *garland*, but being foremost" (BMC 224). This competition, whence the war of every one against every one derives, is a competition for a scarce resource, to be sure, and while it is thereby

a kind of greed or lust, and also submits to a kind of economic analysis, it is certainly not, as Macpherson and similar marxist annotators of Hobbes would construe it, a greed for material gain: the scarcest of all resources for which men compete is *the position of being foremost* -- success in such contention being measured not in wealth, but in *honor*.

FASTER AND FASTER, ALL ACCELERATE -- Chapter 9 in *Human Nature* ends with "A view of the passions represented in a race." This race provides a model for human affectivity and intentionality differing radically from the stimulus-response model derived from the hypothesis that the principle of inertia alone regulates the motions of masses of matter in time. For the competitors in this race, the principle of inertia privileges an attitude of lethal self-satisfaction, poisonous complacency, deadly indolence. Inertia is the enemy. Inertia is stasis. Stasis is death.

In this race, the motions of the living human runners are animated by a principle of non-constancy compelling an unlimited self-overcoming aimed at exceeding every other living competitor, aimed at personal omnipotence. It is the will to power that animates the living human matter running in this race, and the race is the exemplary paradigm for any non-mechanistic psychology -- for the Hobbesian potency theory of the emotions. The race is a competition for the position of being foremost, for the situation of maximum intensity of human being. In this race, the competitors endeavor not merely to "keep up with" each other but rather to "get ahead of" each other, and "if you're not getting ahead, you're falling behind."

The will to power animates the living matter moving in this race, but inertia nevertheless participates. The runner who wins by inertial movements is -- death. And death is a contestant, a contender in the Hobbesian race.

Hobbes articulates the race at the end of Chapter 9 of *Human Nature*, "A view of the passions represented in a race":

this *race* we must suppose to have no other *goal*, nor other *garland*, but being foremost, and in it:

To endeavor, is *appetite*.
To be remiss, is *sensuality*.
To consider them behind, is *glory*.
To consider them before, is *humility*.
To lose ground with looking back, *vain glory*.
To be holden, *hatred*.
To turn back, *repentance*.
To be in breath, *hope*.
To be weary, *despair*.
To endeavor to overtake the next, *emulation*.
To supplant or overthrow, *envy*.
To resolve to break through a stop foreseen, *courage*.
To break through a sudden stop, *anger*.
To break through with ease, *magnanimity*.
To lose ground by little hindrances, *pusillanimity*.
To fall on the sudden, is disposition to *weep*.
To see another fall, is disposition to *laugh*.
To see one out-gone whom we would not, is *pity*.
To see one out-go whom we would, is *indignation*.
To hold fast by another, is to *love*.
To carry him on that so holdeth, is *charity*.
To hurt one's-self for haste, is *shame*.
Continually to be out-gone, is *misery*.
Continually to out-go the next before, is *felicity*.
And to forsake the course, is to *die*.
(BMC 225)

REFORMULATION OF APPETITE AND AVERSION -- Although in Section 2 of Chapter 9 of *Human Nature* Hobbes defines appetite to be the beginning of all animal motion following from delight, or equivalently the helping or accelerating of the self's vital motion by the motion of some other, in Section 6 of this same chapter, appetite, essentially, is redefined:

seeing all *delight* is *appetite*, and presupposeth a *further* end, there can be *no contentment* but in *proceeding*: and therefore we are not to marvel, when we see, that as men attain to more riches, honor, or other power; so their appetite continually groweth more and more (BMC 208).

Appetite is no longer a deterministic, inertial response to an external stimulus: it is disconnected from motion governed by the perpetual self-equivalence expressed by any principle of constancy and linked instead to motion governed by the perpetual self-inequivalence expressed by a principle of non-constancy. Appetite that wills to consume more than what it has consumed is not content to be what it is, but only to become other than what it was: if otherness is at the root of all appetite (Hegel, Lacan), here the definition of the self as a reflexive incongruency installs within the self an otherness that is its very own, while on the other hand the definition of the self as a self-referential equivalence places all otherness beyond and outside of the self. The self in the potency theory may still be a network of reflexes, but it is condemned to be self-stimulating, stimulation out of nothingness, and from this condemnation to perpetual self-transcendence, this condemnation to freedom, there is no appeal. However, the self in the

mechanistic theory -- always the same as itself -- is not self-stimulating, and requires some external alterity for its stimulation.

Appetite, connected with power, is no response to any extrinsic otherness, but rather the self-provoked transcendence of a present possession that will need to be more than what it is to become what it has been. Such appetite, defined reflexively as a competition of the self against the inalienable internal otherness of what it was, will be externalized as a competition of the self against all extrinsic otherness: such appetite can be for nothing but being foremost, and the appetite of every one for exceeding every one is the motive of each to win the race: "But this race we must suppose to have no other *goal*, nor other *garland*, but being foremost, and in it: To endeavor, is *appetite* " (BMC 224). This endeavor is directed toward being foremost, and being foremost is the Hobbesian *highest good* the exact inverse of the aristotelian notion of felicity as repose in perfection. Nevertheless, this Hobbesian highest good remains a principle of *final causality* and as much as Hobbes claims that he has reduced final to efficient causation, in his discussions of power and felicity, Hobbes retains an idea of finality that, even if it is the structural inverse of the aristotelian, preserves teleological determination as an invariant of that inversion.

In the potency theory, as in the mechanistic theory, aversion is endeavor from whatever hinders the vital motion. But in the race, since the vital motion endeavors toward being foremost, that which hinders it is something that interferes with attaining this projected goal, and is therefore to be avoided. Aversion is felt for anything that slows one down or causes one to lose ground with respect to one's competitors.

According to the potency theory, then, appetite and aversion receive these non-mechanistic definitions: the self has *appetite* to exceed every other, and the self has *aversion* to being exceeded by any other. However, as in the mechanistic theory, appetite and aversion are the passions providing the primary *motivation*.

GLORY, DEJECTION, RELATED PASSIONS -- The model of the race represents power relations by means of positional relations, so that if the self is ahead of the other, then the self's power exceeds the other's, and vice versa if the self is behind the other(s). Hence the primary relations of "being ahead of" and "being behind" will define the primary passions of the potency theory: glory and dejection.

Glory is a feeling of an excess of power: "Glory or internal gloriation or triumph of the mind, is the passion which proceedeth from the imagination or conception of our *own power* over the power of him that contendeth with us" (BMC 215). In terms of the race, "To consider them behind, is *glory*. " But glory, as a passion stimulated by imagination, may be false or vain, and in the race such vanity leads to defeat: "To lose ground with looking back, *vain glory*." While glory considers the other as overtaken, Hobbes defines felicity as the consideration of the self as overtaking: "Continually to out-go the next before, is *felicity*," and from this definition of felicity it follows that *joy* (not listed by Hobbes) is simply to out-go the next before.

Dejection is a feeling of a deficiency of power: "The passion contrary to glory, proceeding from the apprehension of our own infirmity, is called humility by those by whom it is approved; by the rest, dejection and poorness" (BMC 216). In terms of the race: "To consider them before, is *humility*," and while such dejection considers the self as overtaken, miser considers the other as overtaking: "Continually to be out-gone, is *misery*," and from misery it follows that *grief* (not defined in Hobbes' enumeration) is to be out-gone by one behind.

Glory is a passion beginning in the *imagination* (BMC 215), but this imagination is not of a solitary and potent self; it is a comparison involving a reference to an other, it is an "imagination or conception of our *own power* above the power of him that contendeth with us" (BMC 215). It is because the feeling of power of the self originates only in the *imagination* that glory demands real acknowledgement from the other. Hobbes illustrates glory's demand for recognition in his discussion of revenge.

Like glory, revenge begins in the imagination, it "ariseth from an expectation or *imagination* of making him that hath *hurt* us, *find* his own action *hurtful* to himself" (BMC 216). Also like glory, revenge wants to triumph over the other. What distinguishes the potency passion of revenge from the mechanistic passion of hate is the distinction between *triumph* and *destruction* as relations to a competitor: "To *kill*, is the aim of them that *hate*, to *rid* themselves out of fear: *revenge* aimeth at *triumph*, which over the dead is not" (BMC 217). Hatred, which is aversion from a painful stimulus, mechanically intends the elimination of such stimulation by destruction. But revenge, requiring both that proximity and preservation of a source of pain ("him that hath *hurt* us"), is in no way mechanical.

Revenge is an extension of glory, for while glory compares, revenge seeks acknowledgement of the comparison. Revenge intends that "him that hath *hurt* us, *find* his own action *hurtful* to himself, and to *acknowledge* the same; and this is the height of revenge" (BMC 216). The mechanical passion of hatred, aiming at the destruction of a painful stimulus, will return evil for evil received (the pain), but such inertial reaction is not revenge: "for though it be not hard, by returning evil for evil, to make one's adversary displeased with his own fact; yet to make him acknowledge the same is so difficult, that many a man had rather die than do it" (BMC 216). While hatred intends a mechanical exchange of evils, revenge demands that the other acknowledge or recognize the superior power of the self. This demand for recognition is in no way mechanical.

Acknowledgement from the other is given as *honor*: "The manifestation of the value we set on one another, is that which is commonly called honouring, and dishonouring" (L 73). Like glory and dejection, which are comparisons of power between self and other, honor and is honor are comparisons of value: "To value a man at a high rate, is to *honour* him; at a low rate, is to *dishonour* him. But high and low, in this case, is to be understood by comparison to the rate that each man setteth on himself" (L 73). Hobbes emphasizes the distinction between the value a man sets on himself and the value others set on him: "For let a man, as most men do, rate themselves at the highest value they can; yet their true value is no more than it is esteemed by others" (L 73). Here Hobbes distinguishes between a man's auto-evaluation, and his "true value," which is the evaluation of others. Perhaps this distinction between self-esteem and "true value" can illuminate the distinction between vain or false glory and true glory -- a distinction which Hobbes does not develop adequately in terms of the rest of his moral theory.

INTOLERABLE EQUALITY -- Since glory is the feeling that the power of the self is greater than that of the other, and dejection is the feeling that the self's power is less than the other's, it appears there could be a passion that is a feeling of the equality of the power of self and other. Such a passion might be *respect*.. In terms of the race, "To consider them beside, is *respect*." But there is no Hobbesian respect, because equality of power in Hobbes is a moral negativity. This is an essential Hobbesian attitude, following from the fact that the position of being foremost cannot be shared.

Appetite fore the position of being foremost, since it is neither enjoyable by many, nor divisible, leads not to cooperation, but to contention: "considering that many men's appetites carry them to one and the same end; which end sometimes can neither be enjoyed in common nor divided, it followeth, that the stronger must enjoy it alone, and that it be decided by battle who is the stronger" (BMC 278). Since self and other contend for that pre-eminence available not to many, but to one only, neither glory (in reality) nor vain-glory (in imagination) can tolerate equality, and men are "by vain-glory indisposed to allow equality with themselves, to others" (BMC 277). The intolerance of equality stems more from vain-glory than glory, since vain-glory is an imagination of power not yet having secured, through struggle, the recognition of the other; it is vain-glory that arouses this struggle: since "some are vainly glorious, and hope for precedency and superiority above their fellows... it must necessarily follow, that those men who are moderate, and look for no more but equality of nature, shall be obnoxious to the force of others, that will

attempt to subdue them" (BMC 277). Since superiority is the goal, equality, so far from ensuring peace, provokes battle: "*From equality proceeds diffidence*. From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies" (L 98). Here it is only noted that competition for material goods only represents competition for glory. In the Hobbesian race, equality is so undesirable that a superior power must endeavor to prevent any future equality; since danger comes "from the equality between men's forces, much more reason is there, that a man prevent such equality before the danger cometh" (BMC 280). So an individual has the "right, by the advantage of his present power to take caution at his pleasure for his security against that other in time to come" (BMC 280). Here the Hobbesian maxim that "conservation is augmentation of the self's power" inverts to "conservation is the diminution of the other's power."

In order for power to be what it is, it must become more than what it was; but power is also a comparison of the power of the self to the power of the other. Hence, in order for the power of the self to be what it is, the power of the other must not become more than what it was -- the power of the other must remain what it is (since to remain what it is, is to become less than what it was).

Due to the structure of Hobbesian competition, the glory of the self implies and is implied by the dejection of the other: glory does not tolerate equality; to an other, the self is either superior or inferior. Similarly, the dejection of the self implies and is implied by the glory of the other. In the race for pre-eminence, either one is overtaken or one overtakes; there is no running side by side, except to be passed or to pass. So far from respect, "*From equality proceeds diffidence*" (L 98); there is "danger from the equality of men's forces" (BMC 280); and "equal powers opposed, destroy one another" (BMC 212). Thus, instead of respect, "To consider them beside, is to *distrust*."

IMAGINATION VERSUS SENSATION: JOY AND GRIEF -- According to Hobbes' mechanistic psychology, sensation is an effect of external motion (of the stimulus) and it obeys the principle of inertial constancy. Imagination is only the continuation of perceptual agitation, and is governed by inertia and bound to presence just like sensation. Such an imagination can have little or no relation to the future: it is as incapable of the projection of a novel situation as it is determined only by inertial motion. In the mechanistic theory, the passions associated with the imagination are joy and grief. In both *Leviathan*, Chapter 6, and *Human Nature*, Chapter 7 (Section 8), joy is a pleasure of the "mind" as contrasted with pleasures of sense. Similarly, grief is a pain of the "mind," opposed to pains of the body or sensual pains. It is not wise here to press Hobbes' use of the term "mind" too far. All that can be said with certainty is that joy and grief arise from the contemplation of future situations, a contemplation in which "reason" assists in the calculation of consequences, but also in which these consequences can arouse emotion only by being presented as images and thus exciting appetite, aversion, etc.

In the mechanistic theory, joy and grief are emotions of the imagination, while in the potency theory the emotions associated with the imagination are glory and dejection. It would appear plausible, then, that the confusions and tensions between the two theories will involve the imagination as a central common term. Indeed, in the second part of *Leviathan* Chapter 6, the emotions of joy and grief take on dominant roles, explaining admiration, shame, pity, emulation, and envy, as well as glory and dejection themselves. In fact, when the mechanistic theory is held to be superior to the potency theory, glory and dejection will be derived from joy and grief, since the role of imagination provides the connection. And this is exactly how glory and dejection are defined in *Leviathan*: "*Joy*, arising from imagination of a man's own power and ability, is that exultation of the mind which is called *glorying*" (L 52) and "*Grief*, from opinion or want of power, is called *dejection* of mind" (L 52). When the potency theory is given precedence over the mechanistic theory, joy will be a species of glory, and grief a species of dejection. It

should also be noted here that in the transition from mechanistic psychology to power psychology, as effected in *Human Nature*, Chapter 8, power will be associated with the imagination, as is done in Section 3 therein.

That glory and dejection are primarily in the imagination rather than in sensation, creates one of the central distinctions between mechanistic and power psychologies. For the primary mechanistic passions, love and hate, are associated with sensation, while the primary potency passions, glory and dejection, are bound up with the imagination. Along with this conception of passion, mechanistic psychology will hold that the imagination is merely a derivative of or subordinate to perception. On the other hand, power psychology assigns the primary place to the imagination, over and above sensation. In addition to these considerations, since glory and dejection are in the imagination, they can be either true or false. And the role of the imagination in power psychology explains much that is unaccountable in mechanistic, inertial terms. Revenge, which is inexplicable in mechanistic terms, makes sense through power psychology's use of the imagination, for revenge is a past dejection of the self by an other, and out of this dejection there is projected this other's future dejection and the self's glory in this triumph. Without imagination, this projection out of dejection makes no sense -- in any case, it makes no mechanistic sense (inertia will not replace present defeat with future triumph).

HOPE, DESPAIR, FEAR, COURAGE -- The definitions of hope, despair, fear, and courage that are presented in the second part of *Leviathan* Chapter 6, are only half comprehensible in terms of the mechanistic model; the paradigm of the race makes their definitions entirely perspicuous. In terms of the race, "To be in breath, *hope*," and from *Leviathan*: "For appetite, with an opinion of attaining, is called *hope*." The two definitions agree, for appetite in the race is for moving ahead of one's competitors, and to be in breath surely gives an opinion that one can do this. Despair is the contrary of hope; in the race, "To be weary, *despair*." In *Leviathan*, despair is appetite without an opinion of attaining. To be weary in a race certainly leads a runner to believe that he will not be able to overtake the field. Courage, in terms of the race: "To resolve to break through a stop foreseen, *courage*." This definition accords with that in *Leviathan*, which defines courage to be aversion with an opinion of avoiding the pain from the averted object but resistance, because in the race what is to be avoided is anything that leads to being overtaken by one's competitors, that is, any hindrance. Courage is an anticipation of a hindrance to be avoided (a "stop foreseen") plus the "resolution to break through" derived from a feeling of sufficient power. The contrary of courage in *Leviathan* is fear, but this key Hobbesian passion is not explicitly listed in the race. Nevertheless, through its implicit presence, it is felt more intensely than all the other passions. Because if it is strange that Hobbes excludes this emotion, it is equally strange that in a list of passions he says "And to forsake the course, is to *die*." If the highest good is the position of being foremost, then the supreme evil is to cease to run, for then one is exceeded by all others. The supreme evil is death, which arouses the greatest aversion, and cannot be avoided in the least. From *Leviathan*, fear is "*aversion*, with opinion of *hurt* from the object." In the race, while a runner may fear all hindrances that he has not sufficient power to avoid, his appetite to be foremost can be balanced only by his aversion to death.

HATRED, LOVE, CHARITY -- Hobbes' definitions of these three emotions present some interesting difficulties. He says: "To be holden, *hatred*." But does "to be holden" mean "to be held back" or simply "to be held onto"? Indeed, this is important, since Hobbes defines love as "To hold fast by another, is to *love*," and this makes it appear that the lover must arouse hatred in the beloved. However, Hobbes goes on to declare "To carry him on that so holdeth, is *charity*." These three together indicate that the lover's love arouses the beloved's hatred, which the beloved may return, curiously, as charity. Despite what one may wish, such "charity out of hatred" cannot be the purest expression of a Hobbesian contempt of man by man, for the one who carries may feel his ability to do so

as an extreme pleasure: "There can be no greater argument to a man, of his own power, than to find himself able not only to accomplish his own desires, but also to assist other men in theirs: and this is that conception wherein consisteth *charity*" (BMC 221).

A possible solution to some of these problems can be obtained by recalling the mechanistic definition of hatred, which is defined as an emotion towards an object to be avoided. In the race, hatred would be felt for anything which causes one to be overtaken by others; hatred is felt for what holds the self back, thus decreasing the self's power. That in the future which is feared, when present, is hated, and hatred not overcome by courage leads to dejection. Hatred, then, is for whatever holds the self back.

The relation of hatred to love becomes clearer: the lover attaches himself to the beloved, and this attachment is a kind of lust, though not specifically sexual, and indeed Hobbes conceives of lust and love as two different names for one passion (BMC 220). This attachment of the lover onto the beloved (the lover "holds fast by" the beloved) "consisteth of two appetites together, to *please*, and to *be pleased*" (BMC 220). The lover takes delight in delighting the beloved, and such delighting "is not sensual, but a pleasure or joy of the mind consisting in the imagination of the power they have so much to please" (BMC 220). The lover takes pleasure in his own power by delighting the beloved, and it is reasonable to think that the lover -- who has an appetite "to *be pleased*" by the beloved -- expects his delight to be reciprocated: the lover expects a charitable beloved. The lover's love, here called "attachment," would thus be reciprocated by the beloved's love, which Hobbes calls "charity."

Nevertheless, charity, as returned love, requires power, and the beloved's love must also be "pleasure or joy of the mind consisting of the power that the beloved has so much of to please the lover." So if the power of the beloved is insufficient for reciprocation, then the lover's attachment must be felt as dejection by the beloved, whose deficient power has been exposed by the lover's excess power. The antithesis of charity, which is the hatred aroused by an incapacity to reciprocate, would be a "pain or grief of the mind consisting of the imagination of the power the beloved has so little of to please the lover." However, such hatred is only a *species* of that general hatred for whatever causes the self to be exceeded by another: the hatred of failed reciprocation in Hobbes is *resentment* which he analyzes in *Leviathan* as "Hate, from difficulty of requiting great benefits" (L 81-2). The failure of reciprocity, it should finally be noted, if it leads to resentment, can only be followed in the Hobbesian system by envy for the lover; but, if the lover can prevent such resentment, the beloved's failure may lead to emulation toward the lover. Attachment reciprocated as charity, or returned as emulation, are the only two possibilities of Hobbesian romance -- contrast with Sartre, "Concrete Relations With Others," in *Being and Nothingness*.

POLITICS OF MOTION AND POWER -- In the mechanistic theory, the primary passions are love and hate; in the potency theory, glory and dejection. From the two primary passions, two different political theories follow: the primary passions establish the primary relations between human beings, and it is only the passions, their interrelations, their mutual checks and balances, which can provide a solid ground and unshakable foundation for any real ethics or politics.

A politics based on the mechanistic theory would be based on love and hate. *Love* causes the *convergence* of individuals, in a mechanical way, for love is a kind of appetite, and the beloved is attractive. That convergence which love causes has mutual affirmation and cooperation among its effects. Love eliminates strife: the lover wishes to be at peace with the beloved, that is, not to be an object of the beloved's aversion, but rather even of the beloved's attraction. Hatred, on the other hand, causes either divergence from or aggression toward the hated object -- aversion, aimed at eliminating a painful stimulus, leads to a "flight or fight" response. In a mechanistic politics, hatred would cause the war of every one against every one, love would sue for peace and the security of the commonwealth. It is significant that Hobbes does not develop such a mechanistic politics,

even though he is aware of "the *love* men bear to one *another*, or pleasure they take in one another's company; and by which nature men are said to be sociable" (BMC 220). Since Hobbes is aware of the mutually attractive and harmonizing powers of love, his failure to derive a politics from it can be taken not as a token of simple neglect, but as a sign of rejection.

Hobbesian hatred, defined mechanistically, is aversion, or endeavor from, a painful stimulus; it is not an appetite for destroying the stimulus. In his mechanistic psychology, Hobbes has identified hatred with repulsion, because mechanism cannot explain an endeavor toward something painful. This inability of mechanistic psychology to distinguish between hatred and repulsion is an incompleteness with an important political consequence: a stimulus-response machine will always flee from rather than fight against. Conflict between such machines can thus arise only when the weaker machine is prevented from fleeing its opponent. Thus, while one machine may be occasionally violent towards another, such violence is contingent and particular -- it is *contrary to the nature* of such a machine: Hobbesian stimulus-response machines are *neither aggressive nor competitive*.

Nevertheless, Hobbes says that "the power of one man resisteth and hindereth the effects of the power of another" (BMC 212). It is the will to power, not inertia, which originates conflict. Hatred, according to Hobbes' mechanistic definition of it, cannot lead to contention -- the war of all against all, as the *natural condition* of human beings, cannot be derived from a hatred which is only an aversion from pain; hostility is an *unnatural* condition of a Hobbesian stimulus-response machine.

This is an example of the insufficiency of mechanistic psychology; in its mechanistic version, Hobbesian hatred is as irrelevant to Hobbesian politics as is the Hobbesian mechanistic version of love.

For Hobbes, a mechanistic politics based on love and hate cannot be a *human politics*; at best it is the animal politics regulating the affairs of the social insects, which live together and "are therefore by Aristotle numbered amongst the political creatures" (L 131). This animal politics of love and hate is derived from the animal psychology of love and hate, from an inertial, mechanistic response to a stimulus -- but Hobbes recognizes that mechanistic animal psychology fails to yield a politically useful human psychology when he rejects the social relevance of love, and also when he discusses "Why certain creatures without reason or speech do nevertheless live in society, without any coercive power" (L 131).

THE FEELINGS OF POWER AND THE INFINITE: HUMAN POLITICS -- The difference between human and animal psychology, thence human and animal politics, is that human interactions are derived from the will to power essentially, and from inertia itself only accidentally, consequentially. Animal psychology consists of the inertial reactions of appetite and aversion to inertial stimuli; as such it never transcends the immediacy of the stimulus. Thrown into reaction only by the appearance and disappearance of external movements, its necessary condition is the *presence* of extrinsic otherness to it -- unable to project a *future* which is *not* (in the Sartrean sense), the temporality of inertia, the temporality of a stimulus-response machine -- a temporality analogous to that of the Sartrean in-itself, yields a politics of *finitude* in which the position of being foremost cannot exist. Human psychology, however, is a psychology of the will to power -- the temporality of the will to power, analogous to that of the Sartrean for-itself, involves a perpetual transcendence, a continual self-overcoming that projects it out of a past which is no longer into a future which is not yet. This temporality of the will to power yields a politics of the *infinite*. The passions of glory and dejection involve this infinity intimately.

Glory causes the convergence of individuals: its demand for recognition from the other creates the attraction; recognition of the self's power to produce either pain or pleasure in the other. But the plurality of individuals assembled by glory are gathered into a competition or race against each other -- hence the cause of convergence, of sociability, is

in Hobbes simultaneously the cause of strife (contrast with love as a cause simultaneously of convergence and peace). In this race, every living human competitor endeavors to overtake every other competitor, to be foremost, to win the race. But to be foremost requires omnipotence, because the conservation of present power consists of its augmentation -- to cease to exceed one's present power is to lose it; the position of being foremost is *secure* only while he who holds it continues, no longer to move ahead of the others (who are already overtaken), but to overtake himself -- chasing his own tail, as it were: "there is no way for any man to secure himself, so reasonable, as anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: and this is no more than his own conservation requireth" (L 99). Such conservation of the position of being foremost, of being the master of all men, is a perpetual labor, an eternal Sisyphean task: the position of being foremost is such that its occupant must run faster and faster to stay in the same place. As a passion compelling the omnipotence of the self, omnipotence felt as supreme glory, the appetite for the position of pre-eminence is animated by a direct moral participation in the infinite; this infinity, the omnipotence of the self, is exhibited to the imagination through vain-glory, which seeks realization as recognized glory through an appetite for unlimited potency.

The contrary of glory is dejection which, so far from gathering individuals, propels them into solitude, yielding the divergence of all into the isolation of each. Ultimately, this isolation is the solitude of the individual in his death, and dejection in its psychopathic form of melancholia leads to "haunting of solitudes and graves" (L 63). In the race, dejection is to see the other ahead, or to acknowledge the self as behind or overtaken. But Hobbes says of this race: "To forsake the course, is to *die*" (BMC 224), and there is the "perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death" (L 80). In this race to be foremost, death is omnipotent, for death overtakes every one -- death proves itself foremost when the foremost forsakes the course. And death dejects every one -- each one's power is less than that of death, for the power of each "ceaseth only in death." The dead may be famous -- still possessed of glory -- but such an afterglow, however radiant, is conferred by the living to be used by themselves: "For men contend with the living, not with the dead; to these they describe more than due, that they may obscure the glory of the other" (L 81). As a passion exhibiting the utter dejection of the self to the imagination (through the passions of pity or envy, when others are seen to die), and as a dejection actually experienced in one's own death, dejection is aroused by the omnipotence of death: it is a direct moral participation in the infinite.

In contrast to an animal politics derived from an animal psychology based on the finitude of untranscendable, perpetual presence, the human politics of *Leviathan* is based on the two peculiarly human passions, two passions of the potency theory: glory and dejection -- passions involving moral participations in the infinite, indeed, of the divine.

FELICITY, FORESIGHT, ANXIETY -- The will to power projects the self into the position of being foremost, but this projection, originally imaginary, must be realized. The successful realization of this projection into the position of being foremost is *felicity*: "Continually to out-go the next before, is *felicity*" (BMC 225). Felicity is the realization of the appetite of the self for omnipotence, an appetite whose satisfaction arouses glory. Felicity is success in the "perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death." Felicity is the continual success of being-ahead-of-itself, the successful realization of power's *existence*: since power must become more than what it was in order to be what it is, it must be realized in order to be. Felicity, as successful being ahead of itself, is not happiness in the repose of being that is what it is, but the realization of past appetite becoming present dissatisfaction projecting future realization:

Felicity is a continual progress of the desire, from one object to another; the attaining of the former, being still but the way to the latter. The cause

whereof is, that the object of man's desire, is not to enjoy once only, and for one instant of time; but to assure forever, the way of his future desire (L 80).

For Hobbes, a projected goal is realized only when it becomes the origin of another project: past desire is satisfied only by becoming present dissatisfaction with its realization, and hence felicity is a perpetual concern with the future realization of a present projection. For Hobbes, felicity requires foresight:

it is impossible for a man, who continually endeavoureth to secure himself against the evil he fears, and procure the good he desireth, not to be in a perpetual solicitude of the time to come (L 87).

In the race to be foremost, "there is no way for any man to secure himself, so reasonable, as anticipation" (L 99) -- it is by foresight that the prudent man secures himself against dejection (the evil he fears) and procures glory (the good he desires).

Foresight is a "perpetual solicitude" which concerns itself with the "time to come," and foresight has thus its futurity. But this futurity is founded on the temporality of power, and power -- because it must become more than what it was in order to be what it is -- is a perpetual projection of the self ahead of itself. In this projection human being is ahead of itself through its imagination: it envisions itself in its future, and this envisioning is foresight. Foresight is the self looking ahead of itself, a looking ahead of itself grounded on that being ahead of itself which for Hobbes is human being. Through foresight human being sees what is ahead: it sees, in Sartrean terms, its possibilities of being -- it sees that which it may realize.

As grounded on that being ahead of itself which is human, foresight is a genuinely human phenomenon, involved with the futurity of human felicity, "whereas there is no other felicity of beasts, but the enjoying of their quotidian food, ease, and lusts" (L 87). Animal life is mechanically responsive to immediate stimuli -- existing in a perpetual present, animal being has "little or no foresight of the time to come" (L 87).

Foresight envisions the future, but that future into which it directs its gaze is *not*. Looking ahead, foresight is haunted by the nihility of that nothingness which is what it is looking into. Through foresight human being envisions that its own nullity is one of its possibilities of being, and that what its projection may realize is the failure of that very projection itself, the cessation of its self-transcendence -- that being which projects itself ahead of its being projects its being into nothingness; human being staring at the infinity of its possibilities, at the omnipotence of its being, is staring into the face of death. It sees death's omnipotence ahead. Foresight entails anxiety:

that man, which looks too far before him, in the care of future time, hath his heart all the day long, gnawed on by fear of death, poverty, or other calamity; and has no repose, nor pause of his anxiety, but in sleep (L 88).

This anxiety in foresight follows naturally from the will to power's projection of the self into the position of being foremost, the position of omnipotence. Felicity is success in the projection's realization, but the projection is never *realized*, and its realization is suspended precariously between being and non-being. But when, in looking ahead, an anxious foresight envisions death, it nevertheless does not see nothing. On the contrary, it sees an uncanny kind of being: it sees its own being stripped of its possibilities of being. When foresight sees the failure of realizing the self's projection, what it envisions is the collapse of the will to power's reflexive incongruity into that self-referential equivalence of being which simply is what it is: it sees the non-constancy of the will to power degenerated into the constancy of inertial being. Anxious foresight is being ahead of itself seeing itself as no longer being ahead.

Matter whose motion originates in that principle of non-constancy which is the will to power is being ahead of itself. As such being its being exists as a projection into nothingness: it is being on the edge of nothingness, being whose ephemeral solidity dissolves in the "fear of death, poverty, or other calamity," being perpetually in the acid heart of that catastrophe which is its failure to realize yet what it has always already projected itself to be. Being ahead of itself lives in the heart of catastrophe, this heart's beating is that being's anxiety. Being ahead of itself is the being of power, but the more power any being has, the more its anxiety intensifies: pride goes before a fall, and great pride hangs, like Icarus, over a great height. Being ahead of itself aims at omnipotence -- but it is no accident that the waxy wings lifting human hubris towards its paradise are melted by that solar effulgence which has always been the symbol of divine glory. Being ahead of itself is burning, incendiary being intending an explosion into its self-made nihilism. It is being in crisis. Apocalyptic being.

THE ONE AND THE MANY -- The Hobbesian race for the position of being foremost, for the omnipotence of the self, begins with a universal and natural equipollence of human beings: "*Men by nature equal*" (L 98). The relation of "beside" is universally valid only at this beginning: at the starting line, no self is ahead of or behind any other. Nevertheless, with respect to its own power, every human being is always already ahead of itself, and the will to power projects every human being out of the uniformity of initial human potency and into the position of being foremost. Because the will to power determines Hobbesian human being ontologically, the projection of each self into the position of being foremost is universal and necessary: the projection is the essence of Hobbesian human nature, and in such a nature, Hobbes believes.

The projection begins with the passion of vain-glory representing the omnipotence of the self to the self in imagination, and as the self is alone with itself in its imagination, so also does it imagine itself to be omnipotent alone, that is, it imagines that out of the totality of human beings, it is the one who is foremost. The representation of the self as omnipotent, as foremost, is attractive to the self and arouses in the present self that appetite which endeavors to realize itself as this imaginary, projected self, that appetite which intends the omnipotence of the self, which intends that the self will be foremost in reality as it is foremost in imagination.

The appetite of the self for its omnipotence, the appetite for the position of being foremost, realizes itself in the passion of glory, which, as the feeling of the power of the self, would be a feeling of omnipotence, that is, supreme glory. But it is in the very nature of power that it includes a reference to otherness: the power of the self is relative to that of the other. For its arousal, glory requires both that the self is ahead of the other and that the other is behind the self. The self is sufficient to affirm the first relation to itself in itself, but the other must affirm the second relation to the self. Such an affirmation from the other to the self is *recognition*, the recognition of superiority through honoring. In order to feel glory, to realize its appetite for potency, the self demands this recognition from the other, and from every other whom it endeavors to exceed. The appetite for being foremost endeavors to exceed every other; glory is to consider them behind, and the appetite for omnipotence realizes itself in the consideration that every other is behind. This is supreme glory, in attaining which the self demands recognition from *every* other.

But in demanding recognition or honor from *any* other, the self is surprised to discover that this other makes the same demand on the self. Because the projection into the position of being foremost determines human being ontologically, that appetite for omnipotence realizing itself in supreme glory is not a mechanical response to a particular or contingent stimulus. On the contrary, that appetite is universal and necessary; with respect to the omnipotence of the self, to being foremost, all intend, though only one will realize. In this situation of universal appetite, because each self demands honor from every other, all human beings maintain their initial equality, which each imagined that he

alone had left behind, and it is precisely because each self is superior to every other that each self is equal to every other.

In the race, each one is projected simultaneously into a position excluding every other; but if the inclusion of each one excludes every other, and if each one is included, then every one is excluded: if the inclusion of all, then the exclusion of each. Each one, thrust into the position, endeavors to expel every other -- it is the projection of *many* into a position occupiable by only *one* that yields the universal competition of each one against every other, and the race for the position of being foremost becomes the war of all against all, an opposition, not of one power against one other power severally and successively, but rather of each power against every other power universally and simultaneously.

Convergence causes enmity: if human beings were not brought together all in the same place at the same time, if their isolation was essential and their contact accidental, as in Rousseau, then instead of being universal and necessary, human conflict would be particular and contingent. But for Hobbes, no one is innocent. Because the will to power brings everyone, all together simultaneously, into a place that can hold only one, each person is every other person's enemy *ontologically*.

The war of each one against every other is a universal opposition of powers. Opposed powers cancel each other out arithmetically (BMC 212), and the race leads to an elimination from each of the greatest quantity of power common to all. This elimination is what Hobbes calls contention. Hobbesian contention is a universal leveling down of potency into impotency, the levelling of the imaginary omnipotence of all into the real powerlessness of each. Contention is that life-and-death struggle for recognition in which the vanity of each one expresses itself as a demand for real honor from every other. In such a battle to the death, the sole survivor will be foremost alone in a solitude frustrating his pride's demand for acknowledgement: the ability of every one to claim recognition as foremost has led to the inability of the foremost to receive recognition from anyone.

The problem of the one and the many is thus not missing from Hobbes. But the traditional and the Hobbesian presentations of this problem are decidedly antithetical. Traditionally, it is the accidental differences of the many that are cancelled out into that unity of the one which preserves what is common to all. But in Hobbes it is what is common to all that contention cancels from each: a precise inversion of the Neo-platonic doctrine of Return. Because personal conservation is augmentation, personal conservation becomes universal destruction. In the Hobbesian convergence of many towards unity, power diminishes. The projection by the will to power of many into a position occupiable by one only establishes that universal antagonism which causes the average power of each to converge towards impotence, towards death. Out of the non-constancy of the Hobbesian will to power there emerges the constancy of inertia; through the impotence of every individual the will to power reveals the omnipotence of stasis and death, and the projection of each self into the Throne of God situates Death thereon.

ABSURDITY AND COMPROMISE -- Hobbesian human being is naturally animated by the will to power, a principle of non-constancy. The will to power is such a principle because of its reflexive incongruity: to be what it is, power must become more than what it was. This failure of self-referential equivalence grounds the will to power's temporality -- thus it is established that the relationship of human being with time is such that this being projects itself ahead of itself, out of a past which is no longer into a future which is not yet. The position of being foremost into which human being projects itself is one that it is always not yet in. The position of being foremost is one which remains perpetually to be obtained, and the will to power's projection establishes the position of being foremost as a situation which every human being must naturally *realize*, placing himself there in future fact as in past imagination. This realization obtains its ontological necessity from the nature of human being: the will to power is the ground of Hobbesian human nature.

As projected into the position of being foremost by the will to power, the being of the self is being ahead of itself. Such being is a being with possibilities of being, possibilities

which it must realize. One of these possibilities is the further progress of the self toward its omnipotence, and the continued realization of this possibility is felicity. But in order to realize any of its possibilities of being, that being which is being ahead of itself must look ahead of itself at these possibilities. Such looking ahead is foresight, which is necessary for felicity. However, one of the possibilities of a being which is ahead of itself is no longer being ahead. Such a failure of being ahead is the failure of the will to power's projection of the self into the position of being foremost, and in this failure, the self drops out of that projection, out of the race. But "to forsake the course, is to die" (BMC 225). Foresight envisions this death, and such a looking is anxiety. This anxiety is a necessary consequence of foresight, which is itself a necessary for felicity. The nature of felicity is such that through anxiety, felicity is destroyed.

However sublimated or repressed the will to power of any particular human being may be, nevertheless this will projects that individual into the position of being foremost with a necessity inescapable except through death. The necessity of the realization of this projection for every human being gathers any multiplicity of these beings together into a competitive organization resembling a race. This race is the natural structure into which such beings are arranged. In this race, the realization of the projected omnipotence of each entails the actuality of the impotence of all; the original non-constancy of individual power levels itself down into the final constancy of universal powerlessness. Because it must become more than it was in order to be what it is, power becomes less than what it was. The nature of power is such that by that nature power is destroyed.

In the structure of the race, there exists an absurdity. Felicity entails anxiety, omnipotence entails impotence. In both cases, what begins with the non-constancy of self-referential inequivalence ends in the constancy of reflexive coincidence, that which is self-modifying changes itself into what is incapable of self-modification, and matter whose motion was governed by the will to power becomes matter moving inertially. But Hobbesian human being is animated by the will to power *naturally*, and hence the naturalness of human being is that kind of nature which is naturally self-annihilating:

the estate of hostility and war being such, as thereby nature itself is destroyed, and men kill one another... he therefore that desireth to live in such an estate as is the estate of liberty and right of all to all, contradicteth himself (BMC 280).

The resolution of this contradiction, the foundation of an order for human performance such that the will to power does not lead to the omnipotence of death and inertial constancy, these are the tasks of Hobbesian politics.

ENDNOTES.

1. Thomas Hobbes is cited from *Leviathan* (abbreviated L), or the collection *Body, Man, Citizen* (abbreviated BMC). These are: *Leviathan*, edited by Michael Oakeshott (New York, NY: Collier Books, 1962). *Body, Man, Citizen*, edited by Richard S. Peters (New York, NY: Collier Books, 1962).
2. The distinction between self-motion and inertial motion is what this is all about. The distinction has a venerable past. See, for example, Socrates' Second Speech in the *Phaedrus*. It is probable that the history of Western philosophy can be interpreted in terms of this distinction, which is in fact the distinction between body and soul. Certainly modern philosophy, dominated by the mind/body problem and Newtonian

mechanism, is deeply troubled by this distinction, and the problem of self-motion is at once an enigma that modernity cannot solve and a mystery threatening modernity.

3. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York, NY: Washington Square Press, 1966), 127.
4. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 147.
5. Leo Strauss, *The Political Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes*, trans. Elsa M. Sinclair (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1984).