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Abstracts of Steinhart Articles |
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Philosophy of MathematicsSteinhart, E. (2003) Why numbers are sets. Synthese 133, 343 - 361.ABSTRACT: I follow standard mathematical practice and theory to argue that the natural numbers are the finite von Neumann ordinals. I present the reasons standardly given for identifying the natural numbers with the finite von Neumann's (e.g. recursiveness; well-ordering principles; continuity at transfinite limits; minimality, and identification of n with the set of all numbers less than n). I give a detailed mathematical demonstration that 0 is {} and for every natural number n, n is the set of all natural numbers less than n. Natural numbers are sets. They are the finite von Neumann ordinals. Philosophy of ReligionSteinhart, E. (2008) The revision theory of resurrection. Religious Studies 44 (1), 1 - 19.
ABSTRACT: A powerful argument against the resurrection of the body is based on the premise that all resurrection theories violate natural laws. We counter this argument by developing a fully naturalistic resurrection theory. We refer to it as the revision theory of resurrection (the RTR). Since Hick's replica theory is already highly naturalistic, we use Hick's theory as the basis for the RTR. According to Hick, resurrection is the recreation of an earthly body in another universe. The recreation is a resurrection counterpart. We show that the New Testament supports the idea of resurrection counterparts. The RTR asserts that you are a node in a branching tree of increasingly perfect resurrection counterparts. These ever better counterparts live in increasingly perfect resurrection universes. We give both theological arguments and an empirical argument for the RTR.
ABSTRACT: Pantheism claims: (1) there exists an all-inclusive unity;
and (2) that unity is divine. I review three current and
scientifically
viable ontologies to see how pantheism can be developed in each.
They are: (1) materialism; (2) platonism; and (3) class-theoretic
pythagoreanism.
I show how each ontology has an all-inclusive unity. I check the
degree to which that unity is: eternal; infinite; complex; necessary;
plentiful;
self-representative; holy. I show how each ontology solves the
problem
of evil (its theodicy) and provides for salvation (its
soteriology).
I conclude that platonism and pythagoreanism have the most divine
all-inclusive
unities. They support sophisticated contemporary pantheisms.
MetaphysicsSteinharte, E. (2007) Infinite machines. In A. Schuster (Ed.), Intelligent Computing Everywhere . New York: Springer, 25 - 43.ABSTRACT: Infinite machines (IMs) can do supertasks. A supertask is an infinite series of operations done in some finite time. Whether or not our universe contains any IMs, they are worthy of study as upper bounds on finite machines. We introduce IMs and describe some of their physical and psychological aspects. An accelerating Turing machine (an ATM) is a Turing machine that performs every next operation twice as fast. It can carry out infinitely many operations in finite time. Many ATMs can be connected together to form networks of infinitely powerful agents. A network of ATMs can also be thought of as the control system for an infinitely complex robot. We describe a robot with a dense network of ATMs for its retinas, its brain, and its motor controllers. Such a robot can perform psychological supertasks – it can perceive infinitely detailed objects in all their detail; it can formulate infinite plans; it can make infinitely precise movements. An endless hierarchy of IMs might realize a deep notion of intelligent computing everywhere. Steinhart, E. (2003) The physics of information. In L. Floridi (Ed.), Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Computing and Information . Malden, MA: Blackwell. ABSTRACT: I examine the computational foundations of possible
physical
systems. I analyze physical laws in terms of algorithms. I analyze the
complexity of physical systems into (1) universes founded on finite
recursion;
(2) universes founded on transfinite recursion; and (3) universes with
non-recursive foundations. Steinhart, E. (2002) Logically possible machines, Minds and Machines 12 (2), 259 - 280. ABSTRACT: I use modal logic and transfinite set-theory to define
metaphysical
foundations for a general theory of computation. A possible universe is
a certain kind of situation; a situation is a set of facts. An
algorithm
is a certain kind of inductively defined property. A machine is a
series
of situations that instantiates an algorithm in a certain way. There
are
finite as well as transfinite algorithms and machines of any degree of
complexity (e.g. Turing and super-Turing machines and more). There are
physically and metaphysically possible machines. There is an iterative
hierarchy of logically possible machines in the iterative hierarchy of
sets. Some algorithms are such that machines that instantiate them are
minds. So there is an iterative hierarchy of finitely and transfinitely
complex minds.
Steinhart, E. (1999) Emergent values for automatons. Ethics and Information Processing 1 (2), 1-6. ABSTRACT: The infrastructure is becoming a network of computerized
machines
regulated by swarms of self-directing software agents. Complexity
encourages
the emergence of new values in software agent societies. Interdependent
human societies and software societies cohabitate and coevolve in a
symbiotic
cooperation of freedoms. Steinhart, E. (1998) Philosophy laboratory. Teaching Philosophy 21 (4), 315-326. ABSTRACT: Philosophical concepts are easier to teach and to learn if
students can directly manually and visually manipulate the objects
instantiating
them. What is needed is a philosophy laboratory in which students learn
by experimenting. Games are highly idealized yet concrete structures
able
to instantiate abstract concepts. I show how to use the Game of Life (a
computerized cellular automaton "game") to teach concepts like:
individuation;
supervenience; the phenomena / noumena distinction; the physical /
design
/ and intentional stances; the argument from design; and models for
Leibnizian
monads. Such formal games are good ways to use computers to teach
philosophy. Steinhart, E. (1998) Digital metaphysics. In T. Bynum & J. Moor (Eds.), The Digital Phoenix: How Computers are Changing Philosophy . New York: Basil Blackwell, 117-134. ABSTRACT: I discuss the view, increasingly common in physics, that
the
foundational level of our physical reality is a network of computing
machines
(so that our universe is ultimately like a cellular automaton). I
discuss
finitely extended and divided (discrete) space-time and discrete
causality.
I examine reasons for thinking that the foundational computational
complexity
of our universe is finite. I discuss the emergence of an ordered
complexity
hierarchy of levels of objects over the foundational level and I show
how
the special sciences study these emergent objects. Steinhart, E. (1997) Leibniz's palace of the fates: A 17th century virtual reality system. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments 6 (1), 133-135. ABSTRACT: One way to think logically about virtual reality systems
is
to think of them as interactive depictions of possible worlds.
Leibniz's
"Palace of the Fates" is probably the earliest description of an
interactive
virtual reality system. Leibniz describes a system for the simulation
of
possible worlds by a human user in the actual world. He describes a
user-interface
for interacting multiple possible worlds and their histories. Steinhart, E. (1994) Structural idealism. Idealistic Studies 24 (1), 77-105. ABSTRACT: Structural idealism uses formal and computational techniques to describe an idealist ontology composed of God and a set of finite minds. A finite mind is a system of private intentional worlds. An intentional world is a connectionist hierarchy of intentional objects (propositions, concepts, sensible things, sensations). Intentional objects, similar to Leibnizian monads, are computing machines. To escape the egocentric predicament, Leibnizian relations of (in)compossibility exist between finite minds, linking them together into a constraint-satisfaction network, thereby coordinating their private intentional worlds. Metaphysics of PersonsSteinhart, E. (2007) Survival as a digital ghost. Minds and Machines 17, 261 - 271.
ABSTRACT: You can survive after death in various kinds of artifacts. You can survive in diaries, photographs, sound recordings, and movies. But these artifacts record only superficial features of your self. We are already close to the construction of programs that partially and approximately replicate entire human lives (by storing their memories and duplicating their personalities). A digital ghost is an artificially intelligent program that knows all about your life. It is an animated auto-biography. It replicates your patterns of belief and desire. You can survive after death in a digital ghost. We discuss a series of digital ghosts over the next fifty years. As time goes by and technology advances, they are progressively more perfect replicas of the lives of their original authors.
ABSTRACT: If the computational theory of mind is right, then minds
are
realized by computers. There is an ordered complexity hierarchy of
computers.
Some finite state machines realize finitely complex minds; some Turing
machines realize potentially infinitely complex minds. There are many
logically
possible computers whose powers exceed the Church-Turing limit (e.g.
accelerating
Turing machines). Some of these supermachines realize superminds.
Superminds
perform cognitive supertasks. Their thoughts are formed in infinitary
languages.
They perceive and manipulate the infinite detail of fractal objects.
They
have infinitely complex bodies. Transfinite games anchor their social
relations. Steinhart, E. (2002) Indiscernible persons. Metaphilosophy 33 (3), 300 - 320. ABSTRACT: I discuss identity and indiscernibility for person-stages
and persons. Identity-through-time is not an identity relation (it's a
unity relation). Identity is carefully distinguished from persistence.
Person-stages are carefully distinguished from persons. Theories of
personal
persistence are not theories of identity for persons. I deal not with
the
persistence of persons through time but with the timeless and necessary
identity and indiscernibility of persons. I argue that it is possible
that
there are non-identical but indiscernible temporally whole persons. I
discuss
the biographies of persons and develop the type / token distinction for
persons. Twins in symmetrical or eternally recurrent universes are
examples
of indiscernible persons. I discuss temporal and modal branching. I end
with survival for person-tokens and eternity for person-types.
Steinhart, E. (2001) Persons vs. brains: Biological intelligence in the human organism. Biology and Philosophy 16 (1) (January), 3-27. ABSTRACT: I go deep into the biology of the human organism to argue
that the psychological features and functions of persons are realized
by
cellular and molecular parallel distributed processing networks
dispersed
throughout the whole body. Persons supervene on the computational
processes
of nervous, endocrine, immune, and genetic networks. Persons do not go
with brains.
Steinhart, E. (1989) Self-recognition and countermemory. Philosophy Today , Vol. 33, No. 4, 302-317 ABSTRACT: I use concepts from Foucault's analysis of the human condition to investigate how we recognize or fail to recognize ourselves in machines like computers. Human beingas are traditionally defined as "rational animals" or as "thinking things". I examine how this self-conception determines our use of computing machines as logical mirrors in which we both hope and fear to see our truest selves. I examine two analogies: (1) how we think of computers as if they were human (self-projection) and (2) how we think of humans as if they were computers (self-reflection). I interpret the humanization of computers and the computerization of humans as ways that thought tries to master its own freedom by thinking of itself metaphorically in terms of something else. NietzscheSteinhart, E. (2005) Nietzsche on identity. Revista di Estetica 28 (1), 241 – 256.ABSTRACT: I gather and constructively criticize Nietzsche's writings on identity. Nietzsche treats identity as a logical fiction. He denies that there are any enduring things (no substances); he denies that there are any indiscernible things in any respect (no universals, no bare particulars). For Nietzsche, the world consists of durationless events bearing non-universal properties and standing to one another in non-universal relations. Events are bundles of tropes. Nietzsche even denies self-identity. His events are self-differing trope-bundles. I link Nietzsche's denial of self-identity with modern treatments of paradox. Steinhart, E. (1999) On Nietzsche. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Pub. Co. ABSTRACT OF BOOK: On Nietzsche
aims to present Nietzsche's thought
as
a coherent and reasonable system rather than as a collage of prophetic
or poetic aphorisms. Nietzsche is a thinker who gives reasons and makes
arguments. At the core of Nietzsche's thought is radical world- and
life-affirmation.
It is that affirmation than which there is none greater. It is an
affirmation
ultimately based on the classical Greek principle of plenitude: it is
better
to be than not to be. On Nietzsche
lays out his views on the human
condition,
religion, language, knowledge, science, truth, the will to power, the
herd
and the individual, and the eternal return. On Nietzsche shows how he
develops
ideas from Plotinus, Anselm, Leibniz, Kant, Schopenhauer, and others.
It
also aims to show how the contemporary Anglo-American tradition has
adopted
many Nietzschean ideas. Steinhart, E. (1999) Nietzsche's philosophy of mathematics. International Studies in Philosophy 31 (3), 19 - 27. ABSTRACT: Nietzsche has a surprisingly significant and strikingly
positive
assessment of mathematics. I discuss Nietzsche's theory of the origin
of
mathematical practice in the division of the continuum of force, his
theory
of numbers, his conception of the finite and the infinite, and the
relations
between Nietzschean mathematics and formalism and intuitionism. I talk
about the relations between math, illusion, life, and the will to
truth.
I distinguish life and world affirming mathematical practice from its
ascetic
perversion. For Nietzsche, math is an artistic and moral activity that
has an essential role to play in the joyful wisdom.
Steinhart, E. (1999) The will to power as parallel distributed processing. In B. Babich & R. Cohen (Eds.), Nietzsche's Epistemological Writings . Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science Series. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 313-322. ABSTRACT: The will to power has non-trivial physical models taken
from
the class of parallel distributed processing systems, specifically
wave-mechanical
discrete dynamical systems with cyclical entropy. The will to power is
thus linked to research in non-linear self-organizing dynamical
systems,
including oscillons, cellular automata, spin-glasses, Ising systems,
and
connectionist networks.
Steinhart, E. (1997) Fragments of the Dionysian Body: The Will to Power as Dynamical System . (Interactive Electronic Text) Watertown, MA: Eastgate Systems. ABSTRACT: This electronic text (originally implemented in Hypercard for Macintosh computers) is a systematic and detailed analysis of Nietzsche's metaphors, symbols, and ideas in The Gay Science. The Gay Science is structured by a large-scale networks of metaphors (e.g. ship, sailor, sea, island, mountain, volcano, tree, sky, bird, storm, sun). Hypertext allows distant aphorisms to be joined for analysis according to their symbols. The Gay Science also contains many of Nietzsche's central themes (e.g. the death of God, the eternal return, the herd and the individual). These themes are joined with the metaphors by analyzing Nietzsche's thought of becoming in terms of dynamical systems. Analogy and MetaphorSteinhart, E. (2005) Generating and interpreting metaphors with NETMET. APA Newsletter on Computing and Philosophy 4 (2). (Electronic publication).ABSTRACT: We review the structural theory of metaphor and the computer program NETMET. According to this theory, metaphors are based on analogies. Analogies establish counterpart relations between approximately homomorphic structures. The truth-conditions for metaphors are based on these counterpart relations. NETMET takes as input a description of a source structure and a target structure. It finds analogies between them, generates counterpart relations, and uses them to generate metaphors. The entailments of the metaphors are generated to specify the meanings (the literal senses) of the metaphors. Steinhart, E. (2001) The Logic of Metaphor: Analogous Parts of Possible Worlds . Synthese Library Vol. 299. ISBN 0-7923-7004-X. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic. ABSTRACT OF BOOK: The Logic of Metaphor uses techniques from
possible worlds semantics to provide formal truth-conditions for many
grammatical
classes of metaphors. It gives logically precise and practically useful
syntactic and semantic rules for generating and interpreting metaphors.
These rules are implemented in a working computer program. The book
treats
the lexicon as a conceptual network with semantics provided by an
intensional
predicate calculus. It gives rules for finding analogies in such
networks.
It shows how to syntactically and semantically analyze texts containing
metaphors and how to use structural similarities between parts of
possible
worlds to provide truth-conditions for metaphors. Meanings for
metaphors
are linked to the modal logics of identity and indiscernibility. The
book
shows how to extend deductive and abductive inference systems to handle
metaphors. It shows how to handle novel metaphorical word-senses. The
Logic of Metaphor
will be useful to philosophers, logicians,
linguists,
and computer scientists. Steinhart, E. (1995) NETMET: A program for generating and interpreting metaphors. Computers and Humanities 28 (6), 383-392. ABSTRACT: Metaphors have computable semantics. A program called
NETMET
both generates metaphors and produces partial literal interpretations
of
metaphors. NETMET is based on Kittay's semantic field theory of
metaphor
and Black's interaction theory of metaphor. Input to NETMET consists of
a list of literal propositions. NETMET creates metaphors by finding
topic
and source semantic fields, producing an analogical map from source to
topic, then generating utterances in which terms in the source are
identified
with or predicated of terms in the topic. Given a metaphor, NETMET
utilizes
if-then rules to generate the implication complex of that metaphor. The
literal leaves of the implication complex comprise a partial literal
interpretation.
Steinhart, E. (1994) Beyond proportional analogy: A structural model of analogy. Pragmatics and Cognition 2 (1), 95-130. ABSTRACT: A model of analogical mapping is proposed that uses five
principles
to generate consistent and conflicting hypotheses regarding assignments
of elements of a source domain to analogous elements of a target
domain.
The principles follow the fine conceptual structure of the domains. The
principles are: (1) the principle of proportional analogy; (2) the
principle
of mereological analogy, (3) the principle of chain reinforcement; (4)
the principle of transitive reinforcement; and (5) the principle of
mutual
inconsistency. A constraint-satisfaction network is used to find the
set
of assignments that preserves the greatest relational structure of the
source. In contrast to the model proposed here, most models of
analogical
mapping use only the principle of proportional analogy. The use of many
principles is shown to be superior in that it permits smoother
integration
of pragmatic factors and results in a more efficient mapping process. Steinhart, E. (1994) Analogical truth-conditions for metaphors. Metaphor and Symbolic Activity 9 (3), 161-178. ABSTRACT: It has often been said that metaphors are based on
analogies,
but the nature of this relation has never been made precise. This
article
rigorously and formally specifies two semantic relations that do obtain
between some metaphors and analogies. We argue that analogies often
provide
conditions of meaningfulness and truth for metaphors. An analogy is
treated
as an isomorphism from a source to topic domain. Metaphors are thought
of as surface structures. Formal analogical conditions of
meaningfulness
and truth are fully and rigorously worked out for several grammatical
classes
of metaphors. By providing analogical meaningfulness and truth
conditions
for metaphors, this article shows that truth-conditional semantics can
be extended to metaphors.
Steinhart, E. & Kittay, E. (1994) Generating metaphors from networks. In J. Hintikka (Ed.), Approaches to Metaphor . Synthese Library. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 41-94. ABSTRACT: We describe a computational model (NETMET) of the semantic
field theory of metaphor (SFTM). The interactionist approach to
metaphor,
recently refined as the semantic field theory of metaphor, asserts that
metaphors are grammatically well-formed utterances combining terms from
distinct but analogous semantic fields. NETMET encodes literal input
texts
as semantic networks of interconnected concept nodes. NETMET uses
clustering
algorithms to find densely interconnected knots of concepts; these are
fields. The user selects a target field. NETMET then finds several
potentially
analogous source fields. The user selects one. NETMET then uses
constraint-satisfaction
algorithms to find the most coherent system of structure-preserving
correspondences
between the source and target fields. The correspondences are used to
move
concepts from the source to the target so that the target is
analogically
extended to more closely structurally resemble the source. NETMET then
generates propositions mixing both original target concepts and
concepts
transferred from the source. NETMET thereby generates many
grammatically
different kinds of metaphors from literal input texts.
Steinhart, E. & Kittay, E. (1993) Metaphor. Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 2452-6. ABSTRACT: We review the main theories of metaphor, particularly from a semantical point of view concerned with meaning, truth, and reference. We outline the semantic field theory of metaphor and explain its semantic advantages over competing theories. |
| 5 April 2008 | |